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Abstract
This paper proposes a dynamic framework to study the timing of balance of payments
crises. The model incorporates two main ingredients: (i) investors have private information; (ii)
investors interact in a dynamic setting, weighing the high returns on domestic assets against
the incentives to pull out before the devaluation. The model shows that the presence of disag-
gregated information delays the onset of BOP crises, giving rise to discrete devaluations. It also
shows that high interest rates can be eﬀective in delaying and possibly avoiding the abandon-
ment of the peg. The optimal policy is to raise interest rates sharply as fundamentals become
very weak. However, this policy is time inconsistent, suggesting a role for commitment devices
such as currency boards or IMF pressure.
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During the 1990’s the world witnessed a large number of balance of payments (BOP) crises, in-
cluding the EMS crisis in 1992, the Mexican crisis in early 1995, the Asian crisis in 1997, the
Russian crisis in 1998, and the Brazilian crisis in 1999. The large, and rapidly growing, literature
on BOP crises has provided many insights into the causes behind these crises. A consensus now
exists about the importance of institutions (e.g. bank supervision, corporate governance), debt
management, and consistency in the setting of monetary and ﬁscal policy. Despite this progress,
however, economists still have a limited understanding of the dynamics and timing of crises.
Balance of payments crises are characterized by two seemingly contradictory features. On the
one hand, BOP crises are usually “large,” in that they involve massive asset reallocations, wild
swings in asset prices, and heavy output losses. On the other hand, BOP crises are often triggered
by shocks that seem too small to account for these eﬀects.1 Another characteristic of BOP crises
is that governments often attempt to prevent them by raising domestic interest rates to contain
capital outﬂows.2
Figure 1 illustrates these characteristics by showing the behavior of exchange rates and domestic
interest rates in selected currency crisis episodes. The two series are constructed by taking averages
of the series corresponding to each country, after shifting the series so that time 0 coincides with
the abandonment of the peg. For the interest rate, we use overnight domestic currency rates, from
which we subtracted the average crawling speed during the year preceding the crisis. Figure 1
shows both the large “discrete” devaluations after pegs are abandoned, and the increase in interest
rates as conditions deteriorate.
In this paper, we propose a dynamic framework for studying the timing of BOP crises that
accounts for the suddenness and size of the crises, while providing a rational for interest rate
defenses. We emphasize the process through which investors learn from each other and its crucial
interaction with interest rate policy, allowing us to characterize the optimal interest rate defense.
We model BOP crises as the equilibrium outcome of a dynamic game between a monetary
authority, which attempts to keep a ﬁxed exchange rate, and a set of investors that at each point
in time decide how much of their capital to invest in the country. The model relies on two basic
1We do not mean that economic fundamentals are unable to account for the severity of the crises, but rather that
the deterioration in fundamentals is too smooth to explain their sudden onset.
2Such policies are often advocated by international ﬁnancial institutions, especially the IMF.
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Figure 1: Behavior of exchange rates and short-term domestic-currency interest
rates around episodes of currency crises. Day 0 is 12/19/94 for Mexico, 8/16/98 for
Russia, and 1/12/99 for Brazil.
ingredients: (i) investors have private information about the state of the economy (in particular,
about the level of the exchange rate in case the peg is abandoned); and (ii) investors interact
in a dynamic setting, weighing the high returns they receive while holding domestic assets (high
domestic interest rate) against the incentives to pull out before the crisis takes place. The crisis is
triggered by some investors selling their domestic assets and starting a run on the central bank’s
reserves, with other investors following suit until reserves are exhausted. Crises are associated
with discrete devaluations, as investors revise downwards their assessments about other investors
private information. As a result, in the run up to the crisis investors’ strategies incorporate an
incentive to take their capital out before the crisis takes place (to avoid capital losses), which they
weigh against the high domestic interest rate. To determine the expected return on domestic assets
investors estimate a “crisis hazard rate,” which depends on investors’ assessment of other investors’
information and is itself endogenously determined by the interaction of domestic interest rates and
investors’ learning process. Importantly, although the timing of the crisis is unpredictable based
on public information, the model has a unique equilibrium.
Two versions of the model are presented. The ﬁrst, in which the domestic interest rate is taken
as exogenous, emphasizes investors’ learning process and its implications for the timing of BOP
2crises. This version provides a number of insights into the behavior of asset prices during crises, as
well as into the eﬀects of interest rates and disaggregated information on their timing.
First, as mentioned above, “large shocks” are not necessary in order for crises to involve discrete
drops in asset prices, even though the model has a single equilibrium.
Second, we show that the presence of private information makes the peg last longer than if the
information were public. This result follows from two features of BOP crises that are captured by
the model. The high returns on domestic assets in episodes of BOP crises create an incentive to
wait past the point when the expected devaluation is zero. Without private information, however,
investors cannot “coordinate” into staying past this point and leave when the size of the devaluation
is zero. In addition, as an attack on a currency takes place, investors become more informed because
they infer the private information of the investors who take their capital out ﬁrst. The remaining
investors then know if the attack would lead to a “revaluation,” in which case they would prefer to
stay in the country.3,4
Third, the ﬁxed exchange rate lasts longer when domestic interest rates are high. This result
follows from the fact that, conditional on other investors’ actions, each investor has greater in-
centives to leave his capital in the country when interest rates are high. In addition, an indirect
channel exists due to the presence of complementarities in investors’ actions: if each investor stays
longer the expected losses from devaluation decrease, further increasing the incentives not to pull
out.
In the second version of the model, we study what the optimal interest rate policy is in such
an environment. We assume that the monetary authority controls the domestic interest rate and
tries to minimize a loss function. The loss function incorporates a (ﬂow) cost of raising interest
rates and a cost of abandoning the peg. We obtain a number of implications for interest rate policy
during BOP crises.
First, the optimal interest rate policy is to raise interest rates sharply when fundamentals
become very weak, as opposed to raising them earlier on by a smaller amount. This follows from
the fact that raising interest rates when fundamentals are very weak is both “more eﬀective,” in
that it is more likely to postpone the attack on the currency than when raising interest rates early
3In other words, if investors start leaving “too soon,” they can recognize their mistake before reserves are exhausted,
which gives rise to probing attacks. If, on the other hand, they start leaving “too late” there is a devaluation.
4The model can thus account for the observation that BOP crises often occur long after problems in the aﬀected
countries are recognized.
3on,5 and “cheaper,” in that it is possible for the cost associated with raising the interest rate not
to be incurred if either the attack takes place or the situation improves earlier on.
Second, there exists a problem of time inconsistency: the monetary authority would be better
oﬀ if it could commit to raising interest rates as fundamentals deteriorate. This is due to the fact
that interest rates at a point in time aﬀect investors’ strategies for previous times and, as a result,
the beneﬁts of high interest rates are “sunk” when that time is reached.6
Third, it is optimal to defend pegs more strongly (i.e. raise interest rates by a larger amount)
in cases of liquidity crises than in cases of solvency crises.7
Fourth, although high interest rates can be an eﬀective defense against speculative attacks, crises
are more likely while interest rates are high, even conditioning on the level of fundamentals. As a
result, empirical studies on the eﬀectiveness of interest rate defenses should be careful in interpreting
episodes in which interest rates are raised but the peg is abandoned as evidence against interest
rate defenses.
Although there are no systematic studies of whether asymmetric information exists in the
context of BOP crises, suggestive evidence exists. Evans and Lyons (1999) ﬁnd a strong positive
correlation between order ﬂow8 and price movements in the US$/DM exchange rate market, which
is consistent with investors’ trades revealing price-relevant private information. Garber (1998)
argues that the existence of derivatives “obscures true risk positions and undermine the usefulness
of balance-of-payments capital account categories.” For example, according to IMF’s International
Capital Markets (1995), published 8 months after the Mexican devaluation, most of the Tesobonos
outstanding at the time of the devaluation were held by foreigners (page 62). However, according to
Garber, all of the US$ 16 billion worth of Tesobonos held by foreigners were involved in swaps with
Mexican banks, so that all the risk was actually held by domestic banks. Furthermore, international
investors do not share information on these types of trades, for they are considered proprietary.
5For any interest rate path, the eﬀect of increasing the interest rate at a point in time increases the equilibrium
probability that the crisis will occur at that point. (This corresponds approximately to uncovered interest parity.)
Correspondingly, the amount of learning that takes place at that point increases, thereby “shifting back” the crisis
distribution function for all previous times.
6This suggests a role for international organizations such as the IMF, or for commitment devices such as currency
boards.
7In the context of this paper, a “liquidity crisis” is a crisis in which the probability that the peg survives increases
when the attack is postponed.
8Evans and Lyons deﬁne order ﬂow as “a measure of buying/selling pressure. It is the net of buyer-initiated orders
and seller-initiated orders.”
4There exists an account of the events that led to the collapse in Mexico’s bond market in which
the crisis was triggered by investors’ realization of the size of the total Tesobono swaps.9 Johnson,
Boone, Breach, and Friedman (1999) ﬁnd that measures of corporate governance have a signiﬁcant
explanatory power for the size of devaluations and drops in local stock markets in a cross-section
of countries during the Asian crisis. Under the assumption that investors have private information
regarding the extent of corporate governance problems in the ﬁrms they invest, it is plausible that
private information played a role in the crisis. Other “evidence” includes the fact that, in many
cases, crises are triggered when an identiﬁable group of investors “pulls out,” such as when domestic
investors refused to roll over Russia’s debt in August 1997.
The paper is organized as follows. Section (2) provides a brief review of the related literature.
Section (3) describes the model under the assumption that the interest rate on domestic assets is
constant. Section (4) solves and analyzes the model. Section (5) calculates the optimal interest
rate policy. Section (6) describes the robustness of the results under alternative assumptions.
Section (7) concludes and suggests some speculative applications of the theory presented in this
paper for contagion, asset-market bubbles, and banking crises.
2 Related Literature
The large shifts in asset holdings during crises initially led observers to associate such episodes with
investor irrationality. The so called ﬁrst-generation approach to BOP crises, initiated by Salant
and Henderson (1978), Krugman (1979), and Flood and Garber (1984), provided an alternative
explanation. If crises mark a switch in regimes, with inﬂation higher after the ﬁxed exchange rate is
abandoned, the desired holdings of domestic currency should likely fall during crises. As a result, a
“run” on the central banks’s reserves could be interpreted as a rational portfolio reallocation. These
models, though, also imply that crises should be fully predictable and, as a result, not associated
with large movements in asset prices.10
The model in this paper shares important features with the ﬁrst generation literature: fun-
9Another piece of evidence that suggests that investors learned about the situation of the Mexican banking system
during the crisis is given by the fact that, in January 1995, the stock prices of the banks fell much more than that of
other companies, even though banks’ stock prices closely followed the stock market index throughout 1994.
10Flood and Garber (1984) and Dornbusch (1987) develop stochastic models of BOP crises that address this point
by assuming the existence of large shocks. Rigobon (1999) presents an alternative argument: “small shocks,” if
unexpected, can give rise to large reassessments about a country’s fundamentals.
5damentals deteriorate monotonically and the timing of the crisis is determined by investors being
indiﬀerent between investing in the country and investing abroad. Figure 2 provides an illustration.
The “shadow exchange rate” (i.e. the exchange rate that would be observed if a successful attack
occurred at a point in time) depreciates over time as fundamentals deteriorate. In the absence of
private information, the peg is abandoned at point A when the shadow exchange rate reaches the
peg, since arbitrage eliminates all other possible times. The exchange rate is thus continuous.
Previous studies of interest rate defenses have mostly concentrated on the eﬀect of interest rates
on the timing of crises through their impact on fundamentals and the shadow exchange rate. For
example, Calvo (1995) argues that even though high interest rates could induce capital inﬂows in
the run up to the crisis, these would be compensated by a larger portfolio reallocation when the
peg is abandoned. He also argues that, since the ﬁscal deﬁcit (or expected future deﬁcits) likely
increases when interest rates are raised to defend a peg, fundamentals deteriorate faster and, as a
result, it is possible for the “defense” to actually hasten the end of the peg. This corresponds to
point B in Figure 2.11 On the other hand, Lahiri and V´ egh (2000) focus on the value of interest
rates after the peg is abandoned and how they aﬀect the desired portfolio reallocation at the time
of the crisis. They show that by promising to raise interest rates once the peg is abandoned,
governments can shift up the shadow exchange rate and, as a result, delay the crisis.
Our approach is quite diﬀerent, since we disregard the eﬀect of interest rates on the shadow
exchange rate. We rather show that when investors have disaggregated information, the peg is not
abandoned when the shadow exchange rate reaches the peg, but at a point that is endogenously
determined by the interaction between interest rates and investors’ learning process. High interest
rates delay the crisis and, as a result, lead to discrete devaluations when the crisis takes place, as
in point C in Figure 2.
An alternative approach, which also accounts for the unpredictability of crises, is to assume the
existence of multiple equilibria. Starting with Obstfeld (1984), second-generation models introduced
the possibility that crises be self-fulﬁlling: if investors expect a crisis, they will act in a way such that
a crisis occurs. However, these models have little to say about the timing of BOP crises, as a wide
range of results can be obtained by assuming appropriate expectational dynamics. Furthermore,
as Morris and Shin (1998) show in a generic second-generation model, the existence of multiple

































Figure 2: Central Bank reserves and exchanges rates in ﬁrst-generation models.
equilibria might not be very robust, as adding even a small amount of noise to investors’ perceptions
about a country’s fundamental eliminates the multiplicity of equilibria.12
Our model is also related to the social learning literature. For example, Caplin and Leahy
(1994), Gul and Lundholm (1995), and Chamley (1998) present models with “informationally-
driven” crises or clustering. Although these models do not deal with interest rate defenses, they
provide the basic intuition for why small shocks can give rise to large crises in the presence of
disaggregated information. However, they are not easy to interpret in the context of BOP crises,
due to the “trade-oﬀs” investors face in choosing their actions in those models. In the social learning
12Furman and Stiglitz (1998) argue that in models of multiple equilibria, since the gains from staying in the country
if the peg survives is of order dt, while the costs if the peg does not survive is large, only unrealistically high interest
rates would be eﬀective in defending a peg.
7literature, which is mostly concerned with industry dynamics or problems that give rise to similar
“reduced-form” models, investors have an incentive to wait to observe other agents actions and face
a cost of waiting. In episodes of BOP crises, on the other hand, investors have an incentive to move
ﬁrst (take their capital out of the country before the crisis takes place) and receive a ﬂow beneﬁt
of waiting in the form of high returns on domestic assets. In addition, in episodes of BOP crises
investors care about other investors’ actions not only because they reveal their private information,
but also because in case of a crisis those who leave ﬁrst have a higher probability of doing so before
the devaluation takes place.13
Two papers which also explore the role of private information during episodes of BOP crises
are Drazen (1999) and Chari and Kehoe (2001). Drazen shows that, in a context where the
government has private information about its objective function, high interest rates can serve as
a signal of “toughness,” providing a rational for interest rate defenses. Chari and Kehoe show
that when investors have private information, they can infer other investors’ private information
by observing their actions, which leads to volatile capital ﬂows and unpredictable crises (herd-like
behavior). We view the model in this paper as complementary to Drazen’s and Chari and Kehoe’s.
A crucial diﬀerence, however, is that they model BOP crises as a sequence of one-shot games,
while we model BOP crises as a fully dynamic game. In Drazen’s words, they make the “crucial
assumption that a representative speculator can fully adjust his position in a given currency at
the beginning of a period. Hence, risk-neutral speculators need only consider the probability of
devaluation in the current period, and need not form expectations of the probability of devaluation
in future periods, to derive their optimal positions.” By treating crises as sequences of one shot
games, these models do not capture the important trade-oﬀ investors face in such environments,
namely, to earn high returns on domestic assets while attempting to pull out before the crisis
takes place.14 An important contribution of this paper is thus to characterize this trade-oﬀ and its
interaction with interest rate policy.
13In social learning models that incorporate non-informational externalities, such as Chamley (1998), complemen-
tarities give agents an incentive to move simultaneously. These models do not capture the incentive to pull out
ﬁrst.
14A more technical issue is that, since in these kind of models the probability of devaluation in future periods does
not aﬀect current investors’ actions, crises can be both predictable and associated with discrete devaluations. This is
because it is not possible to rule out such cases by backward induction, as the one-stage games are only “connected”
through the learning process.
83 The Model
The model is based on a linear ﬁrst-generation-type framework. The main diﬀerence between our
model and other models in the literature is the assumption that investors have private information
regarding the level of the exchange rate in case the peg is abandoned.
Time is continuous and there are two kinds of players; a monetary authority, which attempts
to keep a ﬁxed exchange rate, and a set of investors, who at each point in time decide how much of
their capital to invest in domestic assets. The state of the economy is summarized by a fundamental
that deteriorates monotonically. While the peg lasts, investors receive a return on domestic assets
which is higher than the international rate of return. If there is a speculative attack, investors who
are able to convert their holdings of domestic currency into foreign currency before reserves are
exhausted do not suﬀer capital losses, while other investors suﬀer losses equal to the size of the
devaluation. The interplay between the incentive to pull out before others and the high nominal
returns on domestic assets provides the main forces aﬀecting the behavior of investors.
Monetary Authority
The monetary authority follows a simple rule: buy and sell foreign currency at the ﬁxed exchange
rate while reserves last.15 Without loss of generality, the exchange rate is ﬁxed at 1. Once reserves
are exhausted, the currency is ﬂoated.
Investors
Investors are risk-neutral. They initially have some capital invested in the country, for which
they receive a constant and exogenous return r > 0 in domestic currency. At each point in time,
investors decide how much of their capital to invest in the country, and how much to invest abroad.
The international rate of return is 0, and there are no transaction costs associated with capital
movements. We also assume that investors have a maximum amount of capital (equal to their initial
holdings for simplicity) and that there are no other investors who could invest in the country.16
15In Section (5) we analyze the optimal interest rate policy, allowing the monetary authority to set interest rates
in order to delay, and possibly avoid, the crisis.
16This assumption can be justiﬁed by assuming that investors are capital-constrained “specialists.” In section (6)
we will argue that if a pool of uninformed investors existed who could bring their capital to take advantage of the
high returns, the results would be stronger.
9Investors are heterogeneous and have private information regarding their idiosyncratic charac-
teristics. The speciﬁc dimension of heterogeneity is not crucial for the qualitative predictions of
the model but, for concreteness, we assume that investors diﬀer in the amount of domestic assets
they would be able to liquidate easily if they wanted to take their capital out.17 In the context of
this model, liquid assets are assets which can be sold instantaneously and at a price which is ﬁxed
in local currency (e.g. short-term local-currency bank deposits), while illiquid assets cannot be sold
at any price (or at a big loss, such as real estate or FDI).18
There are two groups of atomistic investors of mass 1 each. All investors within each group
have the same amount of liquid assets or “type,” denoted ai for i = 1,2.
Assumption 1. Each investor knows his own type (and that of the rest of his group), but does not
know the type of the other group. The ai’s are distributed with density function g( ) and support
[am,aM]. g( ) has no atoms and is common knowledge.
The proportion of liquid assets invested in the country by investor j ∈ [0,1] of group i ∈ {1,2}
at time t is denoted by x(i,j,t).19
Environment
Time is continuous. Investors observe capital movements by all other investors.20 The state of the
economy at time t is summarized by a fundamental f(t), which aﬀects both the level of reserves and
the value of the shadow exchange rate (i.e. the exchange rate if the government were to abandon
the peg).21
Assumption 2. Reserves at time t are given by







17In a setup in which the players are a monetary authority defending a peg and a set of speculators deciding when to
attack the currency, identical results would be obtained if speculators had private information regarding the amount
of resources they have available for the attack.
18At least in principle, it is possible to determine the amount of foreign investment by looking at capital ﬂows.
However, information regarding the types of investments and oﬀ-balance sheet transactions is scarce. See discussion
in Garber (1998).
19Note the abuse of notation in that we do not explicitly include the history of past capital ﬂows as an argument
of x( ).
20We could alternatively assume that only net ﬂows are observed without aﬀecting the results.
21This would be the case if the fundamental corresponded to domestic credit, as in Krugman (1979) and Flood
and Garber (1984).
10In other words, reserves equal f(t) minus the amount of capital investors have taken out.
Assumption 3. The shadow exchange rate at time t is given by
Es(t) = 1 + f(t) + e0 − a1 − a2 (1)
where e0 ∈ (0,am) is a constant.
As a result, the size of the devaluation, which is given by a1 + a2 − f(t) − e0, is increasing in
the amount of liquid assets.22
The fundamental f(t) deteriorates monotonically at speed   and time is deﬁned, without loss
of generality, such that f(0) = 2am − e0. We assume that the game starts at a time t < 0 early
enough such that there is an initial period when a devaluation cannot occur.
Assumption 4. The fundamental f(t) follows
f(t) = (2am − e0) −  t
In addition, t < −2
(aM−am)
  (i.e. Es(t) > 1 for all a1 and a2).
Since f(t) falls monotonically at speed  , the peg cannot last forever. Let ¯ t be the time at
which the peg is abandoned, which is given by
¯ t = sup{t : ∀τ ∈ (t,t)R(τ) > 0}, (2)
i.e. when reserves at the central bank reach zero.
The peg is thus abandoned when some investors decide to pull out and reserves are not enough
to cover all desired outﬂows. In that case, reserves are allocated according to a sequential servicing
constraint. The investors who initiated the attack are able to exchange their domestic currency
before others, and reserves are assigned randomly if they are not suﬃcient to cover a group that
moves simultaneously.
Investor i in group j chooses strategy x(i,j,t) to maximize
22Equation (1) implies that the size of the devaluation is increasing in the amount of liquid assets that cannot be
covered by existing reserves, which equals a1 + a2 − f(t).
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where ¯ t is given by equation (2), x+(i,j,t) ≡ limτ→t+ x(i,j,τ), and A(t) is the amount of desired








The ﬁrst term in the maximization problem accounts for the returns while the peg survives.
The second term accounts for the devaluation losses from the capital that the investor did not
attempt to take out at ¯ t. The third term accounts for the devaluation losses from the capital that
the investor attempted to take out, which incorporates the fact that this capital can be taken out
before reserves are exhausted with probability
R(¯ t)
A(¯ t).
Four technical assumptions are needed to rule out some forms of unrealistic behavior. Some
of these assumptions will only be used in the appendix, where a formal analysis of the game is
presented.
Technical Assumption 1. Strategies must be “well-behaved.” For all ﬂow histories, x−(i,j,t) ≡
limτ→t− x(i,j,τ) exists, x+(i,j,t) ≡ limτ→t+ x(i,j,τ) exists, and x−(i,j,t) = x(i,j,t).
Technical Assumption 2. The game is the limit, as ǫ → 0, of the game in which the strategies
x(i,j,t) can be conditioned on ﬂows only up to time t − ǫ.
Technical Assumption 3. The model is the limit of a model with transaction costs as these costs
tend to zero.
Technical Assumption 4. Investors within each group have access to a “correlating device” that
allows them to follow “mixed-like” strategies. The two groups have independent correlating signals
that cannot be observed by investors in the other group.23
23This is analogous to assuming that investors can communicate with other investors within each group and agree
(but not commit) to follow an action. None of the main results of the paper rest on this assumption, as it does not
play any role in the main stage of the game. (It applies only after a failed probing attack.)
124 Analysis
As a benchmark, it is helpful to start by analyzing the model when there is no private information:
Proposition 1. If a1 and a2 are common knowledge there is a unique Nash equilibrium. Investors
leave their capital in the country until time
¯ t = −
(a1 − am) + (a2 − am)
 
,
which satisﬁes Es(¯ t) = 1. At that point they all try to take their capital out, the peg is abandoned,
and the size of the devaluation is zero.
Proof: It is trivial to show that the proposed solution is an equilibrium. To prove uniqueness
note that, since f(t) falls at speed  , the peg must be abandoned, at the latest, when f(t) = 0.
In pure strategies, investors cannot stay past ¯ t in equilibrium, since the crisis would involve a
predictable depreciation. Mixed-strategy equilibria are not possible either, because they must
involve randomizations over exit times up to the time when the crisis is inevitable. As a result, the
“crisis hazard rate” would approach inﬁnity at a point at which Es(t) < 1, which cannot occur in
equilibrium. ￿
This example shows that, in the model presented in this paper, the timing of crises is independent
of the interest rate r when there is no private information.24 The rest of this section studies the
dynamics of crises and the eﬀect of interest rates on their timing when private information is
present.
For a formal analysis of the model, the reader should see the appendix. Here, we take the
following proposition as a starting point, and present a more heuristic approach.
Proposition 2. There is a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium is symmetric
both between the two groups and between diﬀerent investors in a single group. Symmetry within
groups means that investors “move together,” i.e. for all j,j′ ∈ [0,1] and i ∈ {0,1}, and for all
histories of capital ﬂows, x(i,j,t) = x(i,j′,t). In addition, investors always want to have either all
their capital in the country, or all out, i.e. x(i,j,t) ∈ {0,1}.
24This is due to the fact that our model ignores the eﬀect of interest rates on the shadow exchange rate. See Calvo
(1995), Flood and Jeanne (2000), and Lahiri and V´ egh (2000) for discussions on how interest rates aﬀect the timing
of crises through their eﬀect on the shadow exchange rate.
13Proof: See appendix.
The analysis is greatly simpliﬁed by two features of the model. First, since investors are atom-
istic, they do not act strategically, i.e. they take the actions of other investors as given, as opposed to
only their strategies. Together with the absence of transaction costs, this implies that the investors’
maximization problem can be solved pointwise.
The equilibrium of the game is composed of several “stages.” In the ﬁrst stage, investors’
types are private information and their strategies can be summarized by a function ¯ f(a), which
indicates at which value of the fundamental they would leave, conditional on their type. The
ﬁrst stage ends when a group of investors start taking their capital out, thereby revealing their
type. Investors in the other group then either leave or stay, depending on their type. Unless their
amount of investments in liquid assets is very low, investors in the second group leave, exhausting
the government’s reserves and ending the game; otherwise, they stay, the ﬁrst group returns, and
the second stage begins.
In the second stage, the type of the group that initiated the ﬁrst attack (type 2 without loss
of generality) is known, but the type of the other group is only known to be below some value a,
consistent with not having pulled out. The equilibrium in this stage is characterized by a function
¯ f1(a1;a2), which indicates at which value of the fundamental investors in group 1 would leave as a
function of their type and conditional on the type of group 2, and a hazard rate ¯ h(f;a2,a), which
indicates the probability density of group 2’s leaving when the fundamental is f, as a function of
their type and conditional on the maximum possible type for group 1. If investors in group 1 are the
ﬁrst to take their capital out in the second stage, investors in group 2 follow, reserves are depleted,
and the game ends. If the attack is initiated by investors in group 2, the response of investors in
group 1 again depends on their type. If their type is not very low, investors in group 1 also take
their capital out, exhausting reserves and ending the game. Otherwise, investors in group 2 return
and stage 3 begins. Each stage thereafter is identical to stage 2, and the same functions ¯ f1( ) and
¯ h( ) apply.
Since investors can solve their maximization problem pointwise, each stage of the game can be
solved independently. We concentrate on the ﬁrst stage, where most of the insights become clear,
and then brieﬂy describe the subsequent stages.
With some abuse of notation, let us deﬁne a(t) = ¯ f−1(f(t)), where ¯ f−1 denotes the inverse of
14¯ f.25 The function a(t) denotes then the “marginal type” at time t, i.e. the type such that an investor
with that type would leave exactly at time t. For t such that f(t) > ¯ f(aM), we deﬁne a(t) = aM,
since ¯ f−1(f(t)) is not deﬁned. Similarly, for t such that f(t) < ¯ f(am), we deﬁne a(t) = am.
We can solve for a(t) by noting that, when the crisis hazard rate is positive, the marginal type
must be indiﬀerent between investing in the country and abroad in equilibrium.
Proposition 3. In the unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, the ﬁrst stage of the game is
characterized by the “marginal type” function a(t). Investors take all their capital out of the country









(2a(t) − f(t) − e0) (3)
and the boundary condition
a(0) = am.
Proof: Let us deﬁne a1(t) and a2(t) as the marginal type functions for groups 1 and 2 respectively.26
In equilibrium, the marginal investor must be indiﬀerent between staying or leaving. The returns
outside the country are 0, while the returns inside the country consist of the sum of r and the
expected losses from devaluation.
The expected losses from devaluation for an investor in group 1 arise because, when invested
in the country, there is a positive hazard rate for group 2’s pulling out, in which case the investor
would suﬀer devaluation losses with positive probability.27 The hazard rate for group 2’s pulling





25That such an inverse exists follows from the fact that if ¯ f(a) where not strictly increasing, the crisis probability
density would have positive mass at some point in time, which cannot occur in equilibrium since returns are only of
order dt.
26We will use the fact that the equilibrium is symmetric below.
27To make this step rigorous, TA2 is needed. Otherwise, there could be other equilibria in which a group leaves
even though r is higher than the expected devaluation losses due to attacks initiated by the other group. This would
be possible because if one group left at such a time, and the “reaction time” were zero, the other group could follow
immediately. A more formal treatment of this point can be found in the appendix.
15where G( ) is the cumulative distribution of g( ), and
g(a2(t))
G(a2(t)) is the density of a2 at a2(t), conditional
on a2 ≤ a2(t). The probability of an investor in group 1 not being able to take his capital out





, since after investors in group 2
take their capital out only an amount f(t) − a2(t) of reserves are left. Finally, the new exchange
rate is given by equation (1).
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a2(t) + a1(t) − f(t)
a1(t)
 
(a2(t) + a1(t) − f(t) − e0).
Since the solution is symmetric, we can deﬁne a1(t) = a2(t) ≡ a(t), and γ1(t) = γ2(t) ≡ γ(t),
obtaining equation (3).
Finally, let τ be such that a(τ) = am. Then, since γ(t) → ∞ as t → τ, it must be the case that
Es(τ) = 1; otherwise, some investors could suﬀer predictable capital losses by staying too long or
miss predictable capital gains by leaving too early. This is equivalent to a(0) = am.29 ￿
Figure 3 shows the marginal type function a(t) for diﬀerent interest rates r.30 The ﬁgure shows
that, for any values of a1 and a2, the ﬁrst attack occurs later the higher r is. The intuition behind
this result is that, although “learning” (which is closely related to ˙ a(t)) is faster when interest rates
are high, the moment at which this learning starts is determined by the terminal condition. As a
result, when interest rates are high the learning process starts later, since faster learning implies
that more of it can take place closer to t = 0.
28If transaction costs were zero these diﬀerential equations would need to be satisﬁed only if ˙ a1(t) < 0 and ˙ a2(t) < 0.
As a result, there would be other equilibria in which there are alternating periods in which the crisis hazard rate is
zero, then positive, then zero, etc. However, this equilibria are ruled out by TA3. In the appendix we show that if
˙ ai(t) = 0 for some t, then ai(t
′) = aM for all t
′ ≤ t.





∈ (0,1) for all t ∈ [t,¯ t] needs to be satisﬁed. It is satisﬁed
at t = 0 when a1 = a2 = am iﬀ e0 ∈ (0,am), which we assumed in A3. For earlier times, it is also satisﬁed under
the stronger restriction e0 ∈ (0,am − (aM − am)). However, unless under extremely high interest rates, the weaker
restriction is enough. Moreover, even if the constraint were not satisﬁed under the proposed solution, the qualitative
behavior of the model would be the same. The only diﬀerence would be that the path of a(t) in the true equilibrium
would be ﬂatter than in the proposed one, but the eﬀects of interest rates and the information structure on the timing
of the crisis would remain unchanged.
30Equation (3) can only be solved analytically for r = 0, in which case a(t) = am −
µ
2t. For r > 0, it can be shown






e0 , which is useful for the numerical simulation.


















Figure 3: Marginal type a(t) for diﬀerent interest rates. am = 0.5, aM = 1.5, g(a)
is uniform,   = 0.1, and e0 = 0.2. Solid line: r = 0. Dashed line: r = 0.05. Dotted
line: r = 0.2.
Let t1 be the time at which the ﬁrst attack occurs and the ﬁrst stage ends, i.e. a(t1) =
max{a1,a2}. After the initial attack either the peg is abandoned or the second stage of the game
begins. Without loss of generality, let us assume a2 > a1, so group 2 is the ﬁrst to leave.
Proposition 4. If Es(t1) = 1+f(t1)+e0−a1−a(t1) < 1, investors in group 1 also leave and the peg
is abandoned immediately. Otherwise, investors in group 2 return and the second stage begins. The
equilibrium is characterized by a marginal type function a1(t), which denotes the type of investors
in group 1 that would take their capital out at time t, and h(t), which denotes the hazard rate of






a1(t) + a2 − f(t)
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a1(t) + a2 − f(t) − e0
 
(4)








The hazard rate h(t) solves
r = h(t)
 
a1(t) + a2 − f(t)
a1(t)
  
a1(t) + a2 − f(t) − e0
 
(6)
17for a1(t) ≤ f(t1) + e0 − a(t1) and equals zero otherwise.
Proof: See appendix.
To understand the second stage of the game, let us assume that r is very small, which makes it
less likely that the ﬁrst attack will be “successful.” In this case, the equilibrium is characterized by
investors pulling out in the ﬁrst stage at a point when the expected devaluation losses are small,
i.e. when t is such that 2a(t) − f(t) − e0 is close to zero.31 As a result, there is a low probability
that the group that did not initiate the attack has a type close enough to a(t) such that the shadow
exchange rate Es(t) < 1, which implies that the currency will likely survive the ﬁrst attack.
Figure (4) illustrates the case in which the ﬁrst attack is not successful, assuming group 2
attacks ﬁrst (i.e. a2 > a1). The solid line displays the learning process by investors in group 2, and
shows the maximum possible type a1. The dashed line is the marginal type a(t) when no attack
has taken place, and the dotted line is the marginal type a1(t) for group 1 in the second stage,
conditional on a2. The marginal type a(t) falls until it reaches a2 at some time t1, prompting an
attack by group 2. At that point, group 1 leaves and the peg is abandoned if a1 is large enough
such that the shadow exchange rate Es(t1) is lower than 1. If group 1 stays, the second stage begins
with an initial period when the crisis hazard rate is zero and no learning takes place. When the
maximum type for group 1 consistent with the peg having survived intersects the marginal type
function a1(t), investors start learning again. At some point, either a1(t) reaches a1, which triggers
a successful attack by group 1, or group 2 pulls out again. A sequence of “probing” attacks can
ensue, until one takes place when Es(t) < 1, in which case the attack is successful.
We now summarize a number of conclusions that can be drawn from the previous analysis
regarding the eﬀects of disaggregated information on the timing of BOP crises. First, once we
account for the presence of disaggregated information, interest rates have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
timing of crises, in contrast with the case presented at the beginning of the section. In particular,
higher interest rates delay the onset of crises.
Second, for any interest rate r, the presence of private information delays the crisis, in the
sense that the peg lasts longer for all realizations of investors’ private information. The presence of
private information has two main eﬀects. On the one hand, it introduces “noise,” so that investors
31When interest rate diﬀerentials are small, investors do not risk leaving their capital in the country if the expected
devaluation losses are large.











































Figure 4: Second Stage: Probing Attacks. am = 0.5, aM = 1.5, a1 = 1.1, a2 < a1,
g(a) is uniform, r = 0.005,   = 0.1, and e0 = 0.2. Dashed line: a(t). Dotted line:
a1(t). Solid line: max{a1 : a1 is consistent with group 1 not having left}.
do not know precisely when the other investors are going to start leaving. As a result, investors
can “coordinate” into staying in the country for a longer period of time and receiving the high
returns.32 This eﬀect is illustrated in ﬁgure (3), as high interest rates “push back” the distribution
of initial attack times.
On the other hand, disaggregated information makes investors “too optimistic” when the types
are high (large amount of investments in liquid assets), and “too pessimistic” when the types are
low (small amount of investments in liquid assets). The ﬁrst (second) eﬀect tends to make the
ﬁrst attack take place later (sooner) than under symmetric information. Although this seems to
imply that the peg should last less under disaggregated information when types are low, this is not
the case because there is an “asymmetric arbitrage.” When one group leaves, the second group
learns whether Es(t1) < 1, and would follow only if this would cause the exchange rate to devalue.
Namely, the second group can “correct” the mistake by the ﬁrst group if it leaves too early, but
not if it leaves too late.
Third, in the context of BOP crises, private information gives rise to discontinuous drops in
asset prices and, hence, complementarities in investors actions. The asymmetry in the movement
32The term coordination can be misleading, since investors are better oﬀ in the case with disaggregated information
only if r is large relative to µ. However, if we take into account the eﬀect of disaggregated information on interest
rates (which we do in the next section), then investors are in fact better oﬀ in the case with disaggregated information.
19of the exchange rate is due to the high returns inside the country, the fact that investors learn as
the crisis progresses, and the existence of an agent (the monetary authority) which is willing to
buy domestic currency even when a depreciation is expected.
Fourth, the model also sheds light onto the positive relationship between the rate of return and
the speed at which learning takes place.33 The reason is that the faster investors learn, the higher
the crisis-hazard rate is and, thus, the higher the risk premium demanded by investors. However,
in equilibrium an increase in the interest rate implies that the learning process starts later, as less
time is needed to do the same amount of learning. As a result, it is the expectation of high interest
rates in the future, with a correspondingly high learning speed, that makes investors stay now.
Namely, high interest rates at a point in time push back the marginal type functions for all earlier
times. This indicates the possibility of time inconsistency in the setting of interest rate policy.
5 Interest Rate Policy
In the previous section, we showed that domestic interest rates play an important role in the timing
of BOP crisis. In this section, we study the optimal interest rate policy in such an environment.
We assume the monetary authority minimizes a loss function that incorporates the cost of
abandoning the peg, the cost of raising interest rates to defend the currency, and the cost of
reneging from a preannounced defense.
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where ¯ D > 0 is the cost associated with abandoning the peg, Φ > 0 is the cost associated with
deviating from a preannounced interest rate policy, and c( ) ≥ 0 is the ﬂow cost associated with
raising interest rates. In addition, c(0) = 0, c′( ) > 0, and c′′( ) > 0.
Without further changes, the optimal interest rate policy would be to set interest rates equal to
zero. The reason is that the peg is abandoned regardless of interest rate policy and the monetary
33Stock (1987) ﬁnds that the business cycle evolves on an “economic time scale” rather than on a “calendar time
scale.” Interestingly, he ﬁnds that the most important determinant of the economic time scale is the short-term
interest rate, which has an accelerating eﬀect.
20authority gains nothing by delaying the crisis. As a result, the monetary authority would set r = 0
and the peg would be abandoned as soon as the shadow exchange rate Es(t) = 1.34
However, most crises have some liquidity component associated with them. For example, gov-
ernments can implement policies to take a country out of an unsustainable path (such as increasing
taxes or cutting government spending); the situation in international capital markets can improve
and allow the country to ﬁnd new sources of ﬁnancing; or a positive terms-of-trade shock can take
place. Usually, though, these developments take time and are not in the hands of the monetary au-
thority. To capture such features of crises, we modify the model slightly to allow for the possibility
of a turnaround in the economy.35
Assumption 6. With hazard rate ρ, the “turnaround” hazard rate, the game ends, the peg survives,
and the monetary authority is spared all further interest rate costs.
To solve for the optimal interest rate policy, we ﬁrst note that the equilibrium of the investors’
game when the interest rate is variable is similar to the one found in the previous section under a
constant interest rate. The only diﬀerence is that r is replaced by r(t) in equation (3).36
Also, the monetary authority does not need to set a positive interest rate while the crisis hazard
rate is zero. If
t0 ≡ sup{t : a(t) = aM}












where D(s,a) equals the expected losses, as of time s, conditional on the ﬁrst attack being initiated
at time s by a group with type a. Note that the interest rate costs incurred before time s are not
34Note that we assume a zero discount rate. This is not an unreasonable assumption, since episodes of BOP crises
usually only last a few months. However, the monetary authority might be interested in postponing the crisis for
political reasons, which might imply a higher discount rate. In any case, the “turnaround” hazard introduced below
can also account for a discount rate, without aﬀecting the equilibrium of the game.
35The model presented in the previous section was one of solvency crises, since crises occurred with probability 1.
36The turnaround hazard rate does not aﬀect investors’ learning process. The reason is that if the turnaround
takes place, investors get the same return (zero) on domestic and foreign assets.
21included in D(s,a).37 The other terms in the expression are the hazard rate of having an initial
attack at time s, conditional on not having had a previous attack or a turnaround before time s,
which equals 2γ(s) = 2
g(a(s))
G(a(s))(−˙ a(s)); the interest rate ﬂow cost at time s, conditional on the same
event, c(r(s)); and the probability that neither a turnaround nor an attack take place before time
s, which equals G(a(s))2e−ρ(s−t).38
In order to determine D(s,a(s)), one would need to solve a similar minimization problem.
However, this introduces some additional diﬃculties because D(s,a(s)) is deﬁned recursively. To
keep the problem simple, we assume that r = 0 after an initial attack.39 The function D(s,a(s)) is
then given by
D(s,a(s)) = ¯ D
 













The ﬁrst term is the probability that the second group has a type such that the shadow exchange
rate Es(s) < 1, i.e. the probability that the devaluation occurs immediately. The second term takes
into account the fact that, if the second group has a type such that the devaluation occurs later,
the probability that the turnaround takes place is higher. Note that, since we assume r = 0, there
are no further interest rate costs.









2a(s) − f(s) − e0
 
.
Then, from proposition (3), a(s) is given by
37D(s,a) = ¯ D if the peg is abandoned at time s. If the type of the group that did not initiate the attack is low
enough such that the peg is not immediately abandoned, D(s,a) < ¯ D.
38Note that ρ enters the loss function L[t,{r(s)}] in the same way a discount rate would. As a result, ρ can be
taken as the sum of the turnaround hazard rate and the discount rate.
39This assumption does not aﬀect the qualitative results of the model because the peg is abandoned after the ﬁrst
attack with high probability. The reason for this is that the optimal interest rate policy involves postponing the
learning process and, as a result, after the ﬁrst attack takes place the type of the group that did not initiate the
attack is likely large enough such that Es < 1. On the other hand, the “unconstrained” D(s,a(s)) is steeper than
the one assumed here, so the incentives to postpone the learning would be slightly lower without this assumption.
22˙ a(s) = −r(s)k(s,a(s)) (7)
a(0) = am
We ﬁrst ignore issues of time consistency by assuming Φ = ∞. The monetary authority’s













subject to equation of motion (7), a(t0) = aM, and a(0) = am.
Proposition 5. The solution to the monetary authority’s problem when Φ = ∞ is characterized
by




























where a subscript t denotes the partial derivative with respect to time.
Proof: See appendix.
The solution is involved but intuitive. The ˙ a(s) equation has been described above. The
23equation for ˙ r(s) is composed of four terms and a scaling factor. The ﬁrst term captures the fact
that it is desirable to postpone the expected cost D if the turnaround hazard rate is positive or
if D is expected to fall. The second term captures the fact that the monetary authority would
like to postpone raising the interest rate to increase the probability that either the crisis or a
turnaround take place before (saving the interest rate cost). The third term is due to the fact that,
by postponing the increase in the interest rate, and thus the crisis distribution, it is more likely
that the interest rate cost in the future will be incurred. The fourth term is associated with the
fact that if the “eﬀectiveness” of raising interest rates is increasing, the monetary authority has an
incentive to postpone raising them. Finally, the larger the smoothing incentives (i.e. the higher the
second derivative of the cost function) the less the previous four eﬀects matter.40 The condition
that determines t0 comes from the desire to smooth r(s).
Figure (5) illustrates the optimal interest rate policy. The solid lines show the paths for r(s),
a(s), and the probability density of time of ﬁrst attack, corresponding to the solution when Φ = ∞.41
The paths of r(s) and a(s) are conditional on not having had an attack or turnaround prior to
time s. The solution is characterized by a long initial period of “tranquility,” in which r = 0 and
the probability of a crisis is zero. Towards the end, however, interest rates are raised sharply at the
same time that the crisis hazard rate increases. The ﬁgure highlights some of the results described
in the previous section. First, the positive relationship between the interest rate and the speed of
learning is point by point. Namely, along the optimal path of r(s), times of high interest rates are
times in which the probability of observing an attack is high. This is true for both the conditional
probability (given approximately by the slope of a(s)) and the unconditional probability (given by
the density function).
The optimal interest rate path is sharply increasing as fundamentals become very weak, as
opposed to relatively constant at a low value. This is because high interest rates at a point in time
push back the a(s) schedule for all earlier times. In addition, the probability that the interest rate
costs are incurred decreases with the time at which interest rates are supposed to be raised, since
it is more likely that the game ends before that time. As a result, it is both more “eﬃcient” and
“cheaper” to raise interest rates later on.
40Note that partial time derivatives are present instead of total time derivatives. The reason for this is that the
eﬀect of r(s) on the path of a exactly cancels out the term corresponding to the partial derivative with respect to a.
41To carry out the simulation, we use the fact that there are two initial conditions and one ﬁnal condition for







































Figure 5: Optimal path for r(s), corresponding marginal type a(s), and density
function of times of ﬁrst attack. am = 0.5, aM = 1.5, g(a) is uniform,   = 0.1,
e0 = 0.2, ρ = 0.1, ¯ D = 1, and c(r) = 0.5r + r2. Solid line: with full commitment.
Dashed line: with no commitment (r = 0).
However, the fact that the beneﬁts from raising interest rates at a point in time is in postponing
the crisis for earlier times suggests that a problem of time inconsistency might exist. As a result,
we next consider the case in which Φ = 0. To analyze this case, we need to make an assumption
regarding the point at which the monetary authority sets interest rates for times close to t = 0.
Technical Assumption 5. The model is the limit, as ∆t → 0, of a model in which interest rates
are constant within (−∆t,0], (−2∆t,−∆t], (−3∆t,−2∆t], and so for. In addition the interest rate
for s ∈ (−(n + 1)∆t,−n∆t] is set at time −n∆t.
Proposition 6. If Φ = 0 and TA5 holds, the monetary authority cannot commit to any interest
rate policy diﬀerent from r(s) ≡ 0.42
Proof: The proposition follows from a simple backward induction argument. Regardless of previous
system (8). We iterated over diﬀerent t0 until a(0) = am.





µe0 the proposition is true even if the interest rate for s ∈ (−(n+1)∆t,−n∆t]
is set at time −(n + 1)∆t.
25play, the monetary authority will set r = 0 for s ∈ (−∆t,0] at time 0. As a result, the peg must
be abandoned at the latest at time −∆t if Es(−∆t) < 1. Assume that r = 0 for s ∈ (−n∆t,0]
and that the peg must be abandoned at the latest at time −n∆t if Es(−n∆t) < 1. The monetary
authority then does not have any incentive to set r > 0 for s ∈ (−(n+1)∆t,−n∆t] at time −n∆t.
By induction, r(s) ≡ 0. ￿
The dashed line in ﬁgure (5) shows paths for r(s), a(s), and the probability density of time of
ﬁrst attack, corresponding to the solution to the monetary authority’s problem when Φ = 0. The
monetary authority cannot commit to raising interest rates and, as result, r(s) ≡ 0. The case of
low interest rates was discussed in the previous section, and involves investors’ leaving as soon as
a devaluation is possible. This can be seen in the a(s) schedule, which satisﬁes f(s)+e0 −2¯ a(s) =
1. The no-commitment case is then characterized by low interest rates, small devaluations, and
vulnerable pegs.
In order to illustrate the problem of time inconsistency, ﬁgure (6) shows the incentives to deviate
from the optimal full-commitment interest rate policy. The solid line corresponds to the expected
future costs faced by the monetary authority as the crisis progresses, conditional on no previous
attacks or turnaround. For early times the expected costs are an increasing function of time,
since as time passes the probability that the turnaround takes place decreases. The expected costs
eventually become larger than ¯ D = 1, since they include both the likely devaluation and interest
rate costs. As the interest rate costs become sunk, the expected future costs start decreasing. As
s → 0, the costs tend to ¯ D = 1 since the crisis is imminent but no further interest rate costs need
to be incurred. This is in sharp contrast with the behavior of the expected future costs if the
monetary authority deviated from its pre-announced policy. The dashed line shows the expected
costs, as of time s, assuming the monetary authority deviates at s and sets r = 0 thereafter.43 The
reputation cost Φ is not accounted for in the schedule. For early times, while f(t)+e0 −2aM > 1,
this path coincides with the expected costs under Φ = 0, which are much higher than under full
commitment. As the crisis progresses, though, the beneﬁts from high future interest rates become
sunk, and the two schedules start approaching each other. Eventually, the schedule becomes lower
than that under commitment, and the monetary authority has an incentive to deviate.
43Once the monetary authority deviates, Φ is sunk and it becomes impossible to credibly announce any policy
diﬀerent from r(s) ≡ 0.
26As a result, in order for the pre-announced full-commitment interest rate policy to be credible,
Φ needs to be larger than the maximum distance between the two schedules in ﬁgure (6). For
intermediate Φ, the monetary authority can only credibly commit to an interest rate defense which
is less “aggressive.”






















Figure 6: Solid line: L(t), as of t, conditional on reaching t before the ﬁrst attack.
Dashed line: Idem, but assuming r = 0 thereafter.
In addition, note that in the absence of disaggregated information the peg would be abandoned,
as in proposition (1), at a time such that the size of the devaluation is zero. Since this is the same
condition that determines the timing of the crisis under the no-commitment solution, the monetary
authority is better oﬀ in the presence of disaggregated information. This is not due to some form
of transfer from investors, because with perfect information investors would get 0 (r = 0), whereas
they get, in expectation, a positive return under imperfect information. In a sense, the monetary
authority is willing to pay investors to stay longer in order to have a higher probability that the peg
be saved and investors would like to “coordinate” into staying for longer and receive this payment.
However, this coordination breaks down unless investors have private information.44
Finally, the results presented in this section depend crucially on the type of crisis the country
is facing. When the probability of a turnaround is high, the monetary authority gains more by
44We cannot make strong claims as to the welfare implications of disaggregated information since this paper ignores
important ingredients of BOP crises, such as moral hazard considerations. However, although this might imply that
the monetary authority should require ﬁnancial institutions to provide information regarding their activities, our
results suggest that there is a case for not making this information public.
27preannouncing a strong interest rate defense, not only because it is more likely that by delaying
the crisis the peg could be saved, but also because it is less likely that the costs associated with
the interest rate defense will be incurred. In other words, the peg is defended by committing to
raising interest rates in the few cases in which the turnaround does not take place. As a result, it
is optimal to have a more aggressive interest rate defense in cases of liquidity crises than in cases
of solvency crises.
6 Robustness and Alternative Scenarios
Many of the ingredients in the model were introduced in reduced form. Apart from making the
model more tractable, the reduced-form approach allows for a fairly general interpretation of the
results. However, special attention needs to be paid to the question of robustness. This section
explains which assumptions are essential for the results, and in which scenarios they are likely to
be valid.
Policy instruments:
In this paper, we assume that the monetary authority controls domestic interest rates. This
can be rationalized by assuming that domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes. For
example, in the model by Lahiri and V´ egh (2000) the monetary authority controls the return on a
domestic bond which, as opposed to the foreign bond, provides liquidity services.
On the other hand, our model does not rely, in “spirit,” on deviations from uncovered interest
parity. Rather, the main point is that investors’ actions depend not only on present interest
rates but also on the path of expected future rates. When facing a “tough” monetary authority,
investors expect that the monetary authority will raise interest rates sharply if fundamentals became
very weak. Hence, investors are less likely to take their capital out for intermediate values of
fundamentals. When, and if, fundamentals deteriorate, interest rates rise and the crisis becomes
more likely, consistent with uncovered interest parity.
In a more general setting, the monetary authority could beneﬁt from having reserves after the
peg is abandoned. The problem of time inconsistency would likely be more severe in this case, as
the monetary authority would have an incentive to abandon the peg before reserved are exhausted.
Constrained specialists and excess returns:
28Investors receive excess returns from their investments in the domestic economy since they
are indiﬀerent between investing in the country and abroad only at the point at which they take
their capital out. To avoid that private information be revealed by capital ﬂows in the run-up to
the crisis, we assume that investors are ﬁnancially constrained and that the supply of capital is
perfectly inelastic. However, even under a less than perfectly inelastic supply of capital, investors
are probably not able to easily infer other investors’ types by observing capital ﬂows, as long as
there is enough noise and uncertainty in the economy.45
Moreover, adding uninformed investors with a more elastic supply of capital actually makes our
results stronger. For example, assume that uninformed investors bring an amount of capital k(¯ r(t)),
where ¯ r(t) are excess returns which take into account expected devaluation losses for investors who
do not know a1 or a2. In addition, assume that when a group pulls out, the uninformed investors
have the same probability of taking their capital out before the devaluation as the group of investors











. This would imply
that learning could take place even faster, and high interest rates would postpone the crisis even
more than before.46
Sources of private information:
If we assumed that investors have private information about the post-devaluation exchange rate,
without assuming that there is any relationship between “types” and holdings of liquid assets, the
results of the model would not change. However, we prefer to assume that this information is due
to some characteristic that also aﬀects the size of the outﬂows because, otherwise, we would need
to assume that reserves are enough to cover one group but not both. In the model presented in
this paper, this constraint is satisﬁed without any special assumptions on initial reserves.
Other sources of private information that likely play important roles during BOP crises include:
(i) risk characteristics of bank lending, since banks have better information about their own clients
than about those of other banks; (ii) liquidation value of investments; (iii) outside opportunities of
investors; (iv) margin calls investors would be forced to make if a crisis occurs; and (v) investors’
45In the context of herding in ﬁnancial markets, Avery and Zemsky (1998) show that if there exists uncertainty
in a large enough number of dimensions, it can take a long time for investors to learn even if they observe at which
price other investors trade. In addition, oﬀ balance sheet transactions can obscure investors’ positions.
46The existence of excess returns for informed investors does not mean that the free entry condition to become a
specialist does not hold ex-ante, since this decision is made earlier on and might involve costs.
29assessments about the prospects of the country.
Information structure:
The assumption of aggregate uncertainty is necessary for the results and, as a result, it is
important that there be a small number of groups. However, similar results can be obtained with
a unimodal distribution if two requirements are met: there exist “steep” edges or discontinuities,
because if the distribution were smooth private information would be revealed slowly; in addition,
if an investor with type a knows that the discontinuity in the distribution is to the left of a+ǫ, he
must assign a probability to the discontinuity being in [a,a+ǫ] that goes to zero as ǫ goes to zero.
A distribution that satisﬁes these requirements is the one used in Chamley (1998): a rectangular
distribution whose position is unknown, on top of a wider rectangular distribution. These two
assumptions can be somewhat relaxed in the presence of observation “noise.”
We chose to assume the existence of two groups for a number of reasons. First, this allows for
the existence of “probing attacks,” which are necessary to illustrate the one-sided arbitrage channel
in which private information delays the crisis. Second, with the unimodal distribution we would
need to make an ad-hoc assumption about the order in which investors that did not initiate the
attack access foreign currency reserves, which might make the results suspect. Third, there are
actually diﬀerent types of investors and sometimes crises can be traced to the actions of one of
them. For example, some observers argue that the behavior of hedge funds was important in the
onset and spread of the Asian crisis, and versions exist about the Russian crisis being triggered by
domestic investors refusing to roll over Russia’s short-term debt which prompted a similar response
from foreign investors.
Diﬀerent scenarios:
There are a number of scenarios that can be represented by the model presented in this paper.
Most literally, one could think that investors have their capital deposited in domestic currency at
local banks, and decide whether to withdraw their deposits and exchange them for foreign currency.
Or that they have to decide whether to attack the currency by borrowing in domestic currency at
the prevailing interest rate. Another possible scenario is that of a government which is trying to
roll over short-term debt, with investors deciding whether the spreads compensate for the risk of
default. Even if government ﬁnances are in order, the private sector (especially domestic banks)
might face similar liquidity needs. The fundamental could then represent domestic credit, as in
30ﬁrst-generation models, the size of government’s or banks’ short-term liabilities, or the size of bad
loans in the ﬁnancial sector. In these cases, as in our model, investors receive high returns while
the crisis does not occur, their decisions about whether to invest and receive these returns have an
eﬀect on the timing of the crisis, and there is an incentive to be the ﬁrst to leave.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a framework for understanding the dynamics and timing of BOP crises. It
shows that the presence of private information on the part of investors in a simple ﬁrst-generation
model can account for important features of BOP crises. First, crises can involve large drops in
asset prices in the absence of large shocks even in a single equilibrium model. Second, even in
countries whose fundamentals are known to be weak high interest rates can delay the onset of
crises.
The paper shows that the eﬀectiveness of interest rate defenses increases with the degree of
private information. When interest rates are low or there is no private information, pegs are
abandoned at a time such that the exchange rate is continuous. When interest rates are high and
there is private information, pegs last longer and are abandoned at a point such that the exchange
rate suﬀers a discrete devaluation.
In addition, the paper shows that the optimal interest rate policy in episodes of BOP crises is
to sharply raise interest rates when fundamentals become very weak, rather than raising interest
rates by a smaller amount for a longer period of time. However, a problem of time inconsistency
arises. The monetary authority has an incentive to deviate and not to raise interest rates once
fundamentals become weak enough. This emphasizes the importance of commitment devices such
as currency boards or a role for international ﬁnancial institutions such as the IMF.
The model also shows that crises are more likely when interest rates are high, even conditioning
on the level of fundamentals. This has important implications for empirical studies on the eﬀective-
ness of interest rate defenses against BOP crises (such as Kraay (1999)). For example, an episode
in which interest rates are raised but the monetary authority is nonetheless forced to abandon the
peg could be taken as evidence that raising interest rates is not very useful in defending a currency
under attack. However, in the model presented in this paper pegs are more likely to survive if
31interest rates are expected to be sharply raised in the future (i.e. strong defense) even though crises
are more likely while interest rates are high.47
If the dimension along which investors have private information reﬂects some “intrinsic” charac-
teristic, the model can be easily extended to account for the phenomenon of contagion. In such an
extension, crises would only be transmitted to countries whose fundamentals are suﬃciently weak.48
In addition, an externality would exist between the setting of monetary policy in diﬀerent countries
since, by delaying the crisis in one country, monetary authorities delay the learning process in all
other countries as well.
Finally, the framework presented in this paper can probably be applied to episodes of asset
market bubbles and banking crises. The relationship between the rate of return on domestic assets
and the probability of a currency crisis is analogous to the relationship between the high returns to
holding an asset with a bubble and the probability that the bubble “bursts.” Under the assumption
that investors have private information regarding the fundamental value of the asset (i.e. its price
when the bubble bursts), bubbles could probably exist even if investors know that the bubble
cannot last forever. In episodes of banking crises, the relationship between the interest rate on
deposits and the probability that some investors assign to the bank failing due to other investors’
withdrawals poses a similar trade oﬀ on investors’ actions.
47In the aftermath of the Brazilian devaluation in January 1999 the Argentine peso suﬀered very little pressure.
This is likely because investors knew that interest rates would be sharply raised in case of a speculative attack due
to the strong commitment to the currency board. After the Mexican devaluation in December 1994, when this
commitment had not been previously tested, the pressure on the Argentine peso was much greater.
48See Tornell (1998) for evidence that crises are more likely to be transmitted to countries with weak fundamentals.
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34A Analysis of Model with Constant r
Here we present a more formal analysis of the model. Since investors are atomistic and there are
no transaction costs, investors’ actions are taken so as to maximize expected returns pointwise.
Thus, the model can be divided in diﬀerent “stages,” depending on the information investors have
about each other. At the beginning of the ﬁrst stage, types are private information. As the stage
progresses, information is slowly revealed until a ﬁrst “crisis” occurs, in which a group of investors
pulls out, revealing its type. If the attack is not large enough to force the abandonment of the peg,
a second stage begins, which is similar to the ﬁrst, except that now the type of one of the groups
is common knowledge. The “interaction” between the diﬀerent stages is limited, in the sense that
the diﬀerent stages can be analyzed almost independently.










τ : ∀τ′ ∈ (t,τ] A1(τ′) = 0 and A2(τ′) = 0
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be the set of types ai such that, conditional on not having observed any movement by investors in
35the other group, the earliest time a positive amount of capital from investors in group i leaves the





be the set of types ai that would start pulling out exactly at t, conditional on the other group not
having pulled out before. Let
T = {t : ai(t)  = ∅ or a−i(t)  = ∅}






such that, for i ∈ {1,2}, ai(t) is a contin-
uous strictly-decreasing function of t for t ∈ [t0,0], ai(0) = am, ai(t0) = aM, and Ai(t) = 0 for
t < t0.
Proof: The proof contains several intermediate steps:
(i) For all t and ν, a1(t,ν) = ∅ iﬀ a2(t,ν) = ∅. In addition, ∀ai ∈ ai(t,ν) ∃a−i ∈ a−i(t,ν) such
that ai +a−i −f(t+ν)−e0 > 0. This follows from the fact that investors can only condition their
actions at t on ﬂows up to t − ǫ (TA2). As a result, an investor in group i would not pull out at
time t′ ∈ (t − ν,t + ν) if the probability of the other group pulling out is zero or if, even if the
probability is positive, the crisis cannot bring about a positive devaluation.
(ii) For all t, ai(t) = ∅ iﬀ a−i(t) = ∅. In addition, ∀ai ∈ ai(t) ∃a−i ∈ a−i(t) such that
ai + a−i − f(t) − e0 ≥ 0. This follows from (i) and the deﬁnition of ai(t).
(iii) If a′ ∈ ai(t), a′′ ∈ ai(t), a′′ > a′, then [a′,a′′] ⊆ ai(t). This depends on the form of the
equilibrium in the second stage of the game, which will be analyzed below. For now, we just need
that if a group starts pulling out and ai + a−i − f(t) − e0 > 0 a crisis with positive devaluation
takes place immediately with probability 1. As a result, if an investor of type a′ ﬁnds it optimal to
leave (or is indiﬀerent between leaving and staying) then an investor with more liquid investments
will strictly prefer to leave. In addition, if an investor of type a′′ has not left before time t, then an
49It is not possible for investors to play mixed-like strategies in the ﬁrst stage of the game in equilibrium. The
reason is that if investors are indiﬀerent between moving at two diﬀerent times when they are of type ai, they will
strictly prefer to move at the earlier (later) time when their type is higher (lower) than ai. As a result, since the
probability of investors being of a certain type is zero (i.e. g(a) has no atoms), the mass of investors who can play
mixed-like strategies is zero. The situation is diﬀerent in the following stages, since the type of one group of investors
is common knowledge; hence, that group can play mixed-like strategies.
36investor with less liquid assets would have strictly preferred to stay until t.
(iv) For i = 1,2 and for all t ai(t) is either empty or a single point. First, ai(t) cannot have
positive measure. If it did, there would be a positive probability of group i reaching its “threshold
value” at t. As a result, for all ai ∈ ai(t) and a−i ∈ a−i(t), ai +a−i −f(t) −e0 ≤ 0 since otherwise
there would be a positive probability of crisis with positive devaluation at t which cannot occur
in equilibrium. But then there would be a′
i ∈ ai(t) such that a′
i + a−i − f(t) − e0 < 0 for all
a−i ∈ a−i(t) which contradicts (ii). Since a−i(t) cannot be empty either due to (ii), we conclude
that ai(t) cannot have positive measure. This, together with (iii) implies (iv).
(v) T is dense in T′ ≡ [inf{T},sup{T}]. That T is dense at inf{T} and sup{T} is obvious.
Now assume ∃ τ1,τ2 ∈ T′ such that [τ1,τ2]
 
T = ∅. Let τ′
1 = sup{t ∈ T : t < τ1}. Now we use
the assumption that takes the model to be the limit of a model with transaction costs as these
costs tend to zero (TA3). For any positive transaction cost, and regardless of how short [τ1,τ2] is,
∃τ′′
1 ∈ T that is so close to τ′
1 that the probability of having a crisis before τ1 is low enough so that
ai(τ′′
1) has to be empty.50 This contradicts τ′′
1 ∈ T.
(vi) T = T′. Since ai(t) is either empty or a single point, and for every a ∈ [am,aM] ∃t such that
a ∈ ai(t), we can deﬁne a function ti(a) : [am,aM] → T′ as the inverse of ai(t). ti(a) is decreasing
and, from (v), its image is dense in T′. This implies T = T′.51
(vii) For i = 1,2, ai(t) : T → [am,aM] are continuous strictly decreasing functions. This follows
from the fact that ai(t) is 1-to-1 and decreasing.






. If ti(am) < 0, as t → ti(am) < 0 the expected
devaluation losses would tend to inﬁnite since the hazard rate of crisis tends to inﬁnite while the
size of devaluation does not tend to zero. In addition, in equilibrium an investor of type am would
not leave at ti(am) > 0 because the devaluation would be negative with probability 1, and he would
prefer to stay longer. Finally, t0 < −aM−am
  is impossible because investors would not leave if, even
in the case where a1 = a2 = aM, liquid investment are not large enough to exhaust all reserves. ￿
50Investors would compare an arbitrarily small probability of crisis with the transaction costs associated with
leaving at τ
′′
1 and coming back right after τ
′
1, or the losses associated with being out of the country at a time when a
crisis cannot take place (which is at least r(τ2 − τ1)).
51This can be easily proved. Assume τ ∈ T
′ but τ  ∈ T. Since T is dense, ∃{τ1,...,τn,...} such that τn → τ,
τ1 <     < τn < τn+1     < τ, and ∀n τn ∈ T. (For τ = inf{T} a symmetric argument applies.) Let, for all n,
αn ≡ ai(τn). Then {α1,...,αn,...} is a bounded decreasing sequence. Let α be its limit. If ti(α) < τ, then τn is
bounded away from τ and τn  → τ. If ti(α) > τ, then it is impossible that τn < τ ∀n.
37Proposition 8. The ﬁrst stage of the game has a unique and symmetric equilibrium. The equi-
librium is characterized by a function a(t), which denotes the type of investors that would take
their capital out at time t. a(t) is continuous, strictly-decreasing, diﬀerentiable, and is the unique









(2a(t) − f(t) − e0) (9)
that satisﬁes the boundary condition
a(0) = am. (10)
Note: The function a(t) is only deﬁned for t ∈ [t0,0], where t0 satisﬁes a(t0) = aM.
Proof: The proof contains several intermediate steps:
(i) For i = 1,2, ai(t) : T → [am,aM] is diﬀerentiable. Since ai(t) is monotone it must be
diﬀerentiable almost everywhere. (See Kolmogorov and Fomin (1970) page 321.) Thus, if ai(t)
is not diﬀerentiable at τ, ∃ν > 0 such that ai(t) is diﬀerentiable at all points in [τ − ν,τ + ν]
except at τ. We want to show that ai(t) must be diﬀerentiable from the left and from the right
at τ. Assume it is not diﬀerentiable from the left. This means that ∃ǫl such that ∀ν′ > 0,
[max{˙ ai(t) : t ∈ (τ − ν′,τ)} − min{˙ ai(t) : t ∈ (τ − ν′,τ)}] > ǫl. But this is not possible because,
since a−i(t) is monotone, the hazard rate of group 1’s reaching its threshold value (which equals
 (−˙ ai(t))) cannot decrease arbitrarily fast. As a result, the derivatives from the left and from the
right must exist at τ. But they cannot be diﬀerent because a−i(t) is continuous at τ, which implies
ai(t) is diﬀerentiable at τ.
(ii) For i = 1,2 all investors in group i move simultaneously and take all their capital out at
ti(ai). This follows from the fact that, for all t > ti(ai), ∃a′
i < ai such that investors would leave
at t = ti(a′
i) if their type were a′
i. But that means that for all t > ti(ai) investors of type ai are
strictly worse oﬀ staying in the country than outside and, as a result, they would leave at ti(ai).
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a2(t) + a1(t) − f(t)
a1(t)
 
(a2(t) + a1(t) − f(t) − e0)
and satisfy
a1(0) = a2(0) = am
a1(t0) = a2(t0) = aM





. The boundary conditions were obtained in proposition 7. The form
of the diﬀerential equations is derived in the main text.
(iv) ∀t a1(t) = a2(t). The system of diﬀerential equations that determine a1(t) and a2(t) is
symmetric and, in addition, a1(t) and a2(t) must satisfy the same initial condition. As a result,
a1( ) = a2( ). ￿
Later Stages:
Without loss of generality, we assume that group 2 is the one that started pulling out at the end of
the ﬁrst stage and, as a result, a2 is common knowledge. In addition, agents in the second group
know that a1 ∈ [am,a2]. We start the analysis of the second stage assuming that f(t) is high
enough when the ﬁrst stage ends, so that a crisis cannot occur immediately, i.e.
f(t1) > 2a2 − e0.






τ : ∀τ′ ∈ (t1,τ] A1(τ′) = 0
if ∀τ′ ∈ (t1,τ] A2(τ′) = 0
 
∈ (t − ν,t + ν)
 
39be the set of types a1 such that, conditional on not having observed any movement by investors in
group 2, the earliest time a positive amount of capital from investors in group 1 leaves the country





be the set of types a1 that would start pulling out exactly at t, conditional on group 2 not having
pulled out before.
The characterization of group 2’s play is diﬀerent from that of group 1, because a2 is known





τ : ∀τ′ ∈ (t1,τ] A2(τ′) = 0
if ∀τ′ ∈ (t1,τ] A1(τ′) = 0
 
∈ (t − ν,t + ν)
 
be the probability that, conditional on not having observed any movement by investors in group 1,
the earliest time a positive amount of capital from investors in group 2 leaves the country falls in





be the probability density of investors in group 2’s starting to pull out exactly at t, conditional on
group 1 not having pulled out before.53 Let
T =
 







52As in the ﬁrst stage, group 1 cannot play a mixed-like strategy in equilibrium because the are no points with
positive mass in the distribution of types a1.
53If limν→0 d(t,ν) > 0, we can deﬁne d(t) like a distribution with positive mass at t, i.e. a “delta function.” But it
is not necessary to worry much about this because in equilibrium, as will be shown below, the limit always exists.







such that a1(t) is a continuous strictly-
decreasing function of t and d(t) > 0 for t ∈ (t1




0 d(t)dt = 1,
and Ai(t) = 0 for t < t1
0.
Proof: It is not necessary to present it because it is very similar to the proof of proposition 7.
Proposition 10. When a2 is common knowledge, a1 ∈ [am,a2], and time starts at t < −
2(a2−am)
  ,
the game has a unique equilibrium in which all investors in each group share the same strategies.
The equilibrium is characterized by a function a1(t), which denotes the type of investors in group 1
that would take their capital out at time t, and d(t), which denotes the probability density of investors
in group 2’s pulling out. The function a1(t) is continuous, strictly-decreasing, diﬀerentiable, and is






a1(t) + a2 − f(t)
a2
  
a1(t) + a2 − f(t) − e0
 
(11)
that satisﬁes the boundary condition
a1(tm) = am. (12)













where h(t) is the hazard rate of investor 2’s pulling out, which satisﬁes
r = h(t)
 
a1(t) + a2 − f(t)
a1(t)
  
a1(t) + a2 − f(t) − e0
 
. (13)
Note: The function a1(t) is only deﬁned for t ∈ [t1,tm], where t1 satisﬁes a1(t1) = aM.
Proof: It is not necessary to present it because it is very similar to the proof of proposition 8. The
only diﬀerence is in step (ii) of the proof. In this case, it is not necessary that investors in group 2
move simultaneously if there is a positive response time. However, only the equilibrium in which
they move simultaneously survives in the limit as the response time goes to zero (TA2). Also, note
41that although in the proofs we used d(t), h(t) is a more useful characterization of the equilibrium.
￿
Now consider a case when
f(t1) < 2a2 − e0.
In this case there are multiple equilibria; however, one of them strongly dominates the others.
Let
a(t;a2) ≡ max{f(t) − a2 + e0,am} (14)
be the lowest a1 such that Es(t1) ≤ 1 (or am if no such a1 exists). Also let
¯ a(t;a2) ≡ min{a2,a1(t;a2)}.
Proposition 11. When a2 is common knowledge, a1 ∈ [am,a2], and time starts at t1 > −
2(a2−am)
  ,
the game has multiple equilibria. The equilibria are characterized by a∗ ∈ [a(t1;a2),¯ a(t1;a2)].
Investors in group 2 try to take their capital out immediately. Investors in group 1 do the same
if a1 ∈ (a∗,a2]. If a1 ∈ (a∗,a2], reserves are exhausted and the peg is abandoned immediately.
Otherwise, investors in group 2 learn that a1 ≤ a∗ and bring their capital back. After that point
the game follows the unique equilibrium described in proposition (10). Namely, there is a period in
which no attack can occur, which lasts until time t1
0(a∗) such that a1(t1
0(a∗);a2) = a∗. After t1
0(a∗)
the learning process starts, following a1(t;a2) and h(t,a2).
Proof: In the proposed equilibria no investor has an incentive to deviate. First, at the beginning
of the game investors in group 2 have an incentive to leave because there is a positive probability
that group 1’s type is such that a crisis immediately follows. In addition, an investor in group 1
also has an incentive to leave immediately if a1 > a∗ because he knows that all other investors
will leave and, as a result, he would suﬀer devaluation losses if he stayed. After that point, the
proposed strategies constitute a unique equilibrium as proved in proposition (10). That no other
equilibria exist follows from the fact that, if a1 < f(t1) − a2 + e0, there would be a revaluation if
the peg were abandoned immediately and, as a result, investors in group 1 would not leave. ￿
42Out of the continuum of possible equilibria, the one that corresponds to a∗ = a(t1;a2) dominates
the others. For example consider an equilibrium corresponding to a∗ > a(t1;a2). Imagine, though,
that an investor in group 1 thinks there is an arbitrarily small probability ǫ > 0 that the equilibrium
is actually the one corresponding to a∗′ ∈ [a(t1;a2),a∗). Then if that investor had a type a1 ∈
[a∗′,a∗), he would think there is a positive probability ǫ that the devaluation takes place immediately.
As a result, he would have an incentive to deviate and leave for a brief moment, to return only after
observing that, in fact, the other investors in group 1 did not leave. The equilibrium corresponding
to a∗ should then not be expected to be played. Note that the equilibrium corresponding to a∗ is
dominated not only by the one corresponding to a(t1;a2), but also by all intermediate equilibria.
In addition, investors would deviate even if they assign an arbitrarily small probability of deviation
by other investors. The equilibrium corresponding to a∗ = a(t1;a2) then strongly dominates all
others.54
We can now give a full description of the equilibrium of the game when both types are private
information.
Proposition 12. When both a1 and a2 are private information, a1,a2 ∈ [am,aM], and time starts
at t < −2
(aM−am
  , the game has a unique and symmetric equilibrium, with a multi-stage structure.
In the ﬁrst stage, investors stay in the country until time t1 such that max{a1,a2} = a(t1), where
a(t) is determined by equations (9) and (10). Without loss of generality, we assume a2 > a1. At
time t1, investors in group 2 leave. If a1 > a(t1;a2), where a(t1;a2) is deﬁned in equation (14),
investors in group 1 also leave, reserves are exhausted and the peg is abandoned. Otherwise, in-
vestors in group 2 return and the second stage begins. Investors stay in the country until investors
in group 1 pull out when a1 = a1(t), where a1(t) is determined by equations (11) and (12), or until
investors in group 2 pull out, which occurs with hazard rate h(t), where h(t) is determined by equa-
tion (13). If the “attack” is initiated by investors in group 1, investors in group 2 follow, reserves
are exhausted, and the peg is abandoned. If it is initiated by investors in group 2 and a1 > a(t;a2)
investors in group 1 follow, reserves are exhausted, and the peg is abandoned. Otherwise, investors
in group 2 return and stage 3 begins. The game then continues with all other stages being identical
to stage 2.
54This is an extreme form of risk dominance. See Harsanyi and Selten (1988) for an introduction to the concept of
risk dominance.
43B Government’s Problem with Commitment
The government minimization problem involves ﬁnding the ﬁrst order condition with respect to
changes in the interest rate at every point in time. However, given the boundary conditions on
a(t), the interest rate at some other point in time needs to adjust accordingly. In particular, we















         
         
0 for s < t0
r0(v,r,ǫ) for s ∈ [t0,t0 + ǫ)
r(s) for s ∈ [t0 + ǫ,v − ǫ
2)
r for s ∈ [v − ǫ
2,v + ǫ
2]
r(s) for s ∈ (v + ǫ
2,0]
and r0(v,r,ǫ) is such that the boundary conditions are satisﬁed. This deﬁnition is just a way of
formalizing the simple idea that we look at the eﬀect of changes in the interest rate at times close
to v, tracking their eﬀect on r0.
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∂a(l)dl for τ < v
1
2 for τ = v
0 for τ > v
The reason why
∂a(τ)
∂r(v) = 0 for τ > v is that a(τ) only depends on future interest rates, as the
equilibrium is obtained through backward induction. For τ < v, on the other hand, r(v) aﬀects
a(τ) not only through its direct eﬀect on ˙ a(v), but also through its indirect eﬀect on ˙ a for all
44intermediate times.







The eﬀect of changes in r(v) on L[t,{r(s)}] is calculated by taking into account the direct eﬀects
on c(r(v)) and the indirect eﬀects through the path {a(τ)}τ=v























where the subscript “a” means partial derivative with respect to a.
We then set
∂L[t,{r(s)}]





























Apart from this ﬁrst-order diﬀerential equation, we need a boundary condition to fully charac-



















         
         
0 for s < t0(v,r,ǫ)
r(t0) for s ∈ [t0(v,r,ǫ),t0)
r(s) for s ∈ [t0,v − ǫ
2)
r for s ∈ [v − ǫ
2,v + ǫ
2]
r(s) for s ∈ (v + ǫ
2,0]
and t0(v,r,ǫ) is such that the boundary conditions are satisﬁed. Namely, t0 is adjusted instead of









and that, as a result,
∂L[t,{r(s)}]
∂r(v) only diﬀers from the one above in its ﬁrst term. Equalizing the





Since c(0) = 0 and c( ) is convex, this expression is satisﬁed (in the limit) if and only if r(t0) = 0.
This contradicts our assumption that r(t0) > 0 and, as a result, the boundary condition is given
by57
r(t0) = 0.
56Note the abuse of notation in that t0 is both a constant and a function.
57Basically, we have shown that as long as r(t0) > 0 the loss function can be reduced by “smoothing out” r(t0),
while preserving the boundary conditions on a(s).
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